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Introduction by Dustin Walcher, Southern Oregon University
Throughout the twentieth century, revolutionary upheaval was central to the experiences of people
across the globe.  Nowhere was that more true than in Latin America, a region that produced the
century’s first major social revolution, and thereafter experienced repeated cycles of revolution and
counterrevolution in  many countries.[1]   In  recent  years  elements  of  the international  history  of
Bolivia’s 1952 social revolution have expanded.  Because of the country’s exceptional influence in the
region, the United States has figured prominently in that literature.  Glenn Dorn and James Siekmeier
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recently published important books analyzing U.S.-Bolivian relations as the revolution approached,
and during the revolutionary era.[2]  Although the Bolivian Revolution contained many of the features
of a popular social revolution, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration ultimately chose a strategy of
engagement – seeking to contain communist elements within the revolutionary coalition by working
with the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario party (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, MNR). 
In essence, that was the policy that the John F. Kennedy administration inherited in January 1961. 
 
Thomas  Field’s  From Development  to  Dictatorship  provides  a  focused  analysis  of  U.S.-Bolivian
relations during the era of the Alliance for Progress.  The Bolivian Revolution was, by January 1961,
an entrenched feature of the country’s domestic political landscape.  But like any political movement,
the revolution was subject to redefinition – and the Bolivian leaders of the 1960s continued to contest
the meaning of their revolution.  Field examines the relationship between the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations and the second Victor Paz Estenssoro administration (1960-1964).  Paz Estenssoro
had been a leader of the 1952 revolution, and served as the nation’s first revolutionary president
from 1952 to 1956.  During Paz Estenssoro’s second presidency, Field holds that he embraced
authoritarianism as he worked with U.S. officials to craft a strategy that would marginalize the far
left, empower the military, and reform the economic system.  He was rewarded; as Field points out
“by 1964 the country was the second highest per capita recipient of US aid in the world, with the
Alliance for Progress development program providing roughly 20 percent of Bolivia’s gross domestic
product” (3).  That approach widened socio-political cleavages in Bolivia, and was ultimately unable
to bring economic prosperity and social stability.
 
Participants in this roundtable offer mixed assessments.  Siekmeier, Amy C. Offner, and Thomas
Tunstall  Allcock  each,  on  the  whole,  offer  positive  appraisals.   “Extensively  and  inventively
researched, engagingly narrated, and consistently thought-provoking,” writes Allcock, “this is an
example of international history at its best.”  He further offers that aspects of the narrative are
“gripping in a manner that is rarely found in academic studies.”  Offner declares that “Field presents
a harrowing vision of Bolivia under the Alliance for Progress, arguing that development programs
fueled authoritarianism and created the conditions for military dictatorship.”  Most importantly,
Offner, Siekmeier, and Allcock are convinced by Field’s central argument that in Bolivia the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations preferred authoritarian-led development from the outset.  Allcock goes
on to praise Field’s analysis of Bolivian political and social history – especially among members of the
political left.
 
Philip E. Muehlenbeck, by contrast, is far more critical of Field’s conclusions.  While praising Field
for  conducting  expansive  multi-archival  research,  carefully  highlighting  Bolivian  agency,  and
producing a compelling narrative, Muehlenbeck is left unconvinced by Field’s analysis.  Specifically,
he disagrees that the Kennedy administration preferred authoritarian to democratic leadership, citing
Kennedy’s  efforts  to  distance  himself  from  dictators  in  other  parts  of  the  world.   Second,
Muehlenbeck  argues  that  Field  exaggerates  the  degree  to  which  the  Kennedy  and  Johnson
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administrations aided the Bolivian military.  In dollar terms, Muehlenbeck observes, the vast majority
of U.S. financial assistance to Bolivia during those years was designated for economic development,
not military purposes.
 
Muehlenbeck’s disagreement with Field and the other reviewers reflects recent efforts to revise the
critical view of John F. Kennedy’s foreign policy leadership present in much (but certainly not all) of
the existing historiography.  Historians have offered substantial critiques of Kennedy’s approach to
Latin America in particular.[3]  Muehlenbeck, together with Robert Rakove, has taken the lead in trying
to revise that view, particularly as it relates to the Global South.  Rather than being myopically
focused on buttressing anti-communist leaders with little consideration for the character or brutality
of their regimes, the Kennedy administration cultivated a more nuanced approach, seeking to nurture
authentically nationalist,  anticommunist regimes with democratic tendencies in the Global South
according to Muehlenbeck and Rakove.[4]
 
To some extent, Muehlenbeck’s critique of Field provides a useful case study on historical methods –
showcasing  how  different  historians  emphasize  different  pieces  of  evidence  to  support  their
underlying theses.  For example, in arguing that Field overstates the degree to which Washington
partnered with and relied upon the Bolivian military, Muehlenbeck cites the low level of military
assistance  relative  to  other  aid  provided  to  the  country  under  the  Kennedy  and  Johnson
administrations (he reports that military aid never exceeded 7.8 percent of total assistance to Bolivia
during this time period).  He also observes that “[m]ore than any other United States president
(including Jimmy Carter) Kennedy sought to distance himself from autocratic rulers whom he viewed
as relics of the past.”  Kennedy went so far as to avoid meeting with King Saud of Saudi Arabia, even
when the autocratic Saudi leader rented a house in Palm Beach merely fifteen minutes from the
Kennedy compound.  For Muehlenbeck, Kennedy’s reluctance to meet with authoritarian leaders
reflected his abhorrence of such regimes. 
 
Field takes a different approach.  He points out that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations relied
upon the Bolivian military to administer developmental assistance – not just military aid.  He also
argues that by conditioning U.S. support on such actions as breaking a communist-led union at the
Siglo XX mine, Washington intervened to support a fundamentally antidemocratic approach and
buttressed the authoritarian tendencies of the Paz Estenssoro government.  For Field, the symbolic
value of Kennedy’s failure to call on authoritarian leaders was less important than the effect of the
administration’s policies in rural Bolivian mining districts. 
 
Siekmeier, Allcock, and Offner also suggest some areas where Field’s work could be improved. 
Siekmeier would like to have seen Field better contextualize his analysis – to “situate Bolivia, and
U.S.-Bolivian relations, in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations more generally.”  Allcock
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agrees that “the book is somewhat less ambitious regarding the inter-American context of the period
under consideration.”  Offner finds that “an even richer book might have been written, bringing the
methods of social and cultural history to bear on Field’s remarkable source base.”  She points to the
important parts of Field’s narrative that touch on the construction of Bolivian society – and the
different ways groups of miners and their wives sought to restructure that society and its political
economy – as ripe for such analysis. 
 
Siekmeier agrees that Field could have provided greater analytic depth, but points to his exploration
of Bolivia’s political economy as the most underdeveloped.  “[I]t would have been nice to know what
sort of differences/similarities there were between U.S. developmentalists and Paz Estenssoro with
regard to what sort of economy Bolivia should work towards in the long run,” he writes.  “What
visions did the different players have for Bolivia’s economy in the future?”  Finally, while Allcock
praises Field for his overall analysis of Bolivian politics and society, he finds that “[t]he Bolivian
political right … is regularly invoked as a threat to Paz, but is not illuminated in any great detail until
the emergence of a right-wing guerrilla faction near the end of Paz’s presidency.”  He also finds that
“in contrast with the richly detailed telling of developments in Bolivia, events in Washington are
somewhat more opaque.” 
 
From Development to Dictatorship embodies some important trends in recent writing on U.S.-Latin
American relations.   Like  William Michael  Schmidli’s  The Fate  of  Freedom Elsewhere  and the
previously cited books by Dorn and Siekmeier, it demonstrates the continuing utility of bilateral
studies in uncovering key issues in international history.[5]  Field carefully explains how authoritarian
developmentalism in Bolivia emerged both as a function of conditions imposed upon U.S. assistance,
and domestic Bolivian political dynamics.  He provides insight into how the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations attempted to co-opt a revolutionary movement – and the myriad ways in which
different Bolivians sought to shape their country’s engagement with Washington, resist the policies
developed by Paz Estenssoro and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and achieve personal
gains.   From  Development  to  Dictatorship  exposes  the  complexity  of  a  multidimensional  and
interconnected political process. 
 
Participants:
 
Thomas C. Field Jr. is Assistant Professor in the College of Security and Intelligence at Embry-
Riddle University.   His first book, From Development to Dictatorship,  was published by Cornell
University Press in 2014.  Field is the recipient of the 2011 Unterberger Dissertation Prize and the
2013 Bernath Article Prize, both from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.  He is
currently working on an international history of Bolivia in the era of Ernesto “Che” Guevara.
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Dustin Walcher  is  Associate Professor and Chair  of  History and Political  Science at  Southern
Oregon University.  A specialist in international history, the history of U.S. foreign relations, and
inter-American affairs, his scholarship analyzes international economic policy, global capitalism, and
social disruption.  He is currently revising a manuscript that examines the link between the failure of
U.S.-led economic initiatives and the rise of social revolution in Argentina during the 1950s and
1960s. 
 
Thomas Tunstall Allcock is a Lecturer in American History at the University of Manchester. He
received a BA in History and American Studies and an MA in U.S. Foreign Policy from the University
of Nottingham, and his Ph.D. in History from the University of Cambridge in 2012. He has recently
published articles in Diplomatic History and The Journal of Cold War Studies, and is currently writing
a book on Lyndon Johnson and Latin America.
 
Philip E. Muehlenbeck, a Professorial Lecturer in history at George Washington
University, is the author of Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist
Leaders  (Oxford  University  Press,  2012),  and  editor  of  Religion  and  the  Cold  War:  A  Global
Perspective (Vanderbilt University Press, 2012) and Race, Ethnicity, and the Cold War: A Global
Perspective  (Vanderbilt  University  Press,  2012).  His  current  research  projects  are  on  US-USS-
-Czechoslovak-British competition for African civil aviation markets and on Czechoslovak policies
toward Africa from 1955-1968.
 
Amy C. Offner is an assistant professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania.
She earned her  Ph.D.  at  Columbia and is  currently  writing a  history of  Cold War anti-poverty
programs, social conflict, and economic thought in the U.S. and Colombia.
 
James F. Siekmeier received his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1993, where he studied the history of U.S.
foreign relations under the direction of Walter LaFeber. He has published three books, and co-edited
two documents  collections.  In  addition,  he has published articles  in  Diplomatic  History,  Pacific
Historical Review, and The Latin Americanist, among other journals. He has taught in Iowa, Texas,
and Bolivia (Fulbright Senior Scholar Fellowships). From 2001-2007 he compiled American Republics
volumes for the FRUS series at the Historian’s Office, U.S. Department of State. Currently he is an
Associate Professor of History at West Virginia University. He is currently working on a manuscript
on the history of Latin American nationalism in a globalizing world.
Review by Thomas Tunstall Allcock, University of Manchester
With From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era
Thomas C.  Field,  Jr.  has  produced a  splendid  piece of  scholarship.  Extensively  and inventively
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researched,  engagingly  narrated,  and  consistently  thought-provoking,  this  is  an  example  of
international history at its best. In chronicling the impact of the Kennedy-era Alliance for Progress in
Bolivia, Field has made a substantial contribution to our understanding of both Bolivian history and
the consequences of U.S. actions during the first half of the ‘development decade.’
 
The central contention of From Development to Dictatorship is relatively straightforward. Bolivia, a
recipient of substantial U.S. aid since the early 1950s, was viewed in Washington as an ideal test-case
for the Kennedy administration’s modernization theory-driven aid program, the Alliance for Progress.
Throwing their support behind President Victor Paz Estenssoro, the development minded Alliance
planners envisaged a modernized Bolivia in which the power of the troublesome mine unions was
broken,  and  something  closer  to  American-style  capitalism  flourished.  As  Field  convincingly
demonstrates, this process required repression, the circumvention of democratic process, and an
increasingly prominent role for the Bolivian military, yet was ultimately unsuccessful. From its very
inception, “the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia was an experiment in authoritarian development” (17).
 
Over  the  course  of  six  chapters  Field  chronicles  the  destructive  impact  of  developmentalism,
including violent crackdowns against the mines, increasingly entrenched political divisions, and the
final downfall of President Paz, who was overthrown in military-led coup despite continued support
from Washington. The level of detail present in much of the narrative reflects a vast knowledge of
Bolivian history and culture, and an easy familiarity with what is shown to be a highly complex and
divided political scene. One of the book’s great strengths is the ease with which a dizzyingly large
cast of characters, featuring national politicians, charismatic union leaders, duplicitous government
officials, frustrated generals, peasant militias, misguided diplomats, and even Canadian priests on an
anti-communist crusade are woven into a coherent, engaging, and convincing analysis. Indeed, the
episode in which U.S. aid workers were held hostage in a dynamite-rigged union hall in response to
the government’s arrest of two key union leaders, while politicians from all sides desperately sought
a solution is gripping in a manner that is rarely found in academic studies.
 
This level of detail is possible only due to the highly impressive depth of the research upon which the
book is constructed. Key archives in Bolivia and the United States are supplemented by documents
from France, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic. Just as important are the several dozen
interviews conducted with many significant figures involved in the events chronicled. While there are
obvious concerns with relying too heavily upon the memories of those with a personal stake in
shaping the historical record, the interviews rarely form the basis of Field’s arguments, instead
serving to add detail, texture, and context to complex issues. The benefits of this approach are most
apparent when addressing questions that would be all but impossible to answer by relying on official
records,  such  as  the  extent  of  President  Paz’s  knowledge  and  tolerance  of  Cuban-sponsored
campaigns targeted at Bolivia’s neighbors. Through a series of interviews the most likely explanation
of Paz’s “double-dealing” to maintain a delicate balance of domestic and international interests is
assembled, even as the author acknowledges that a degree of ambiguity remains inevitable (72). 
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That From Development to Dictatorship focuses on a relatively short time period, 1960-1964, further
encourages the detailed approach taken throughout. The longer histories of U.S.-Bolivian relations,
the Bolivian revolution, and the formulation of the Alliance are given brief consideration, but for the
most part this remains a tightly focused study of the final years of the Movimiento Nacionalista
Revolucionario’s (MNR) dominance of Bolivian politics and its violent end. In chronicling those years,
Field largely, and admirably, avoids heavy-handed moral judgements, allowing the complexity and
ambiguity of developments to be fully aired. Neither the instigators of the November 4 1964 coup or
the increasingly repressive Paz government emerge from the book with a great deal of credit, and
while the influence of the United States is regularly shown to be deleterious, Washington’s collection
of often well-meaning diplomats and technocrats are never demonised. Indeed, unlike in numerous
other cases, it was U.S. support for, not opposition to, the established government that contributed
most to its downfall, alienating the Bolivian left while strengthening the military. As Field concludes,
“it is tempting to search, but an easy villain of 4 November does not exist” (193).
 
While others taking part in this roundtable will be better placed to comment on Field’s contributions
to the history of Bolivia, some of the most striking aspects of the book for me are related to the
Alliance for Progress more broadly. As a vast and ill-defined program, incorporating almost every
nation of the hemisphere and a variety of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, the Alliance has
often proved challenging for historians to engage with. Most studies of the program, or President
John F. Kennedy’s wider Latin American policy, that have tried to draw general conclusions regarding
its successes and failures have by necessity taken a broader approach that focuses on deliberations in
Washington and limited snapshots of the Alliance in practice.[6] In focusing in such detail on one
country, Field provides a companion to these works and a model as to how we can piece together a
much more accurate understanding of the Alliance period as a whole. Field demonstrates beyond
doubt that in Bolivia – and presumably elsewhere – the willingness,  indeed eagerness,  to place
political stability and gradual economic development ahead of democratic progress was present from
the very start, as reflected in the desire to break the power of the miner’s unions, and increase the
capabilities and influence of the military. From Development to Dictatorship therefore repudiates the
traditional interpretation of the Alliance as a well-intentioned aid program that gradually ‘lost its
way,’[7] while refraining from blaming the United States for all Bolivia’s problems. In Field’s telling,
political liberalisation barely registered as a goal for Alliance planners; instead the modernizing
‘technocrats’  were  always  “ideologically  motivated  footsoldiers  in  the  Kennedy  administration’s
anticommunist crusade” (33). Despite seemingly ideal conditions in which to prove the validity of the
modernizing crusade, particularly Paz’s willingness to vigorously implement economic reforms, the
Alliance, and Paz’s government, failed in Bolivia. This serves to emphasize to an even greater degree
than previous studies both the scale of the challenge faced by the Alliance, and the vast hubris of its
architects.
 
Although not addressed in as much detail, Field also questions another traditional Alliance narrative
when the transition from John Kennedy to Lyndon Johnson is portrayed as having had little effect on
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Bolivian policy.  Although entering office  during a  dramatic  point  in  U.S.-Bolivian relations,  the
aforementioned hostage crisis, Johnson is shown to have embraced the Kennedy position of staunch
support for Paz’s authoritarian brand of modernisation. Rejecting, in this one case at least,  the
argument originally made by Kennedy loyalists that the Alliance was fundamentally reconfigured by
Johnson,[8] even the often controversial Johnson aide Thomas Mann is described by Field as having
been in complete agreement with the Kennedy administration’s view of Paz and the MNR, believing
the President to be “the only man there who can hold things together” (136).
 
While providing a model for studies of the Alliance’s impact in a single nation, the book is somewhat
less ambitious regarding the inter-American context of the period under consideration. In contrast to
recent works such as Tanya Harmer’s Allende’s Chile which seeksto position the 1972 Chilean coup
within the complex interplay of inter-American politics,[9] in From Development to Dictatorship Cuba is
the only nation outside of Bolivia and the United States to receive any significant consideration. To a
great extent this is understandable, Field is writing a study of Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress
and I do not wish to fall in to the trap of calling for a different book from the one that he has written.
Nonetheless, more consideration of certain developments would have been welcome, such as the
possible impact of the Brazilian coup of March 1964. Stephen Rabe in particular has identified the
military-led and U.S.-endorsed ouster of President Joao Goulart as a key turning point of the Alliance
era, signalling to other would-be plotters that democracy came a distant second to anti-communism
and economic stability in deciding which governments would receive backing from Washington, while
Harmer also emphasises the role of the Brazilian military government in Allende’s downfall several
years  later. [10 ]  Even  a  conclusion,  already  somewhat  implied  by  its  absence,  that  despite  the
chronological proximity of the two military seizures of power, the situation in Brazil had a negligible
impact in Bolivia would provide a useful counterpoint to existing studies.
 
A somewhat unfortunate consequence of the depth, detail, and nuance with which certain groups –
the MNR and its factions, the miners, and the U.S. embassy in particular – are addressed is that it
does throw into relief that others are inevitably slightly less well developed. The Bolivian political
right, for instance, is regularly invoked as a threat to Paz, but is not illuminated in any great detail
until the emergence of a right-wing guerrilla faction near the end of Paz’s presidency. Perhaps this
has more to do with who was willing to be interviewed for the project rather than a deliberate choice
on the part of the author. Similarly, and this may reflect my own research interests rather than any
deficiencies in the book, in contrast with the richly detailed telling of developments in Bolivia, events
in Washington are somewhat more opaque. I would have welcomed more information regarding the
priority that developments in Bolivia were assigned in relation to other nations receiving Alliance aid
by the program’s increasingly pressured administrators, or if the distancing of key Kennedy aides like
Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. from Latin American policy in 1962 and 1963 had any
discernible impact. I am, for instance, less convinced than Field that Assistant Secretary of State
Edwin  Martin  embraced  the  principles  of  modernisation,  or  that  the  ‘ideologically  motivated
footsoldiers’ retained their dominance under his stewardship of the inter-American bureau. That the
modernisers retained their pre-eminence on the ground in Bolivia appears beyond doubt, but I am
curious as to how this related to the bureaucratic reorganisations that occurred in Washington under
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Martin, and, more substantially, under Thomas Mann.
 
These criticisms should not detract from what is ultimately a highly impressive achievement. In
producing a wonderfully researched and engagingly written international history, Field has made an
important contribution to the history of inter-American relations, one of the most vibrant subfields of
diplomatic history.[11] He has also largely managed to avoid becoming too entangled in the debates
over  historical  guilt,  agency,  and methodological  approach which have tended to  dominate  the
subfield of late, both in print and during many recent conference panels.[12] From Development to
Dictatorship, it seems to me, provides an impressively balanced example of how to navigate such
choppy  and  occasionally  hostile  waters.  Even  as  the  damaging  impact  of  developmentalism is
chronicled there are few outright villains in Field’s narrative. Instead there are multiple competing
forces all possessing their own complex and sometimes contradictory goals, exercising, with varying
degrees  of  success,  their  own  agency,  yet  not  escaping  their  share  of  responsibility  for  the
denouement of November 1964. The book is also a demonstration of how a focused study of the
Alliance in one nation answers questions that broader studies of U.S. policy, inter-American relations,
and the Cold War cannot, while in turn raising questions to which those types of studies would be
ideally placed to respond. In short,  From Development to Dictatorship  makes an important and
provocative contribution to constantly evolving debates, and is highly recommended.
 
Review by Philip E. Muehlenbeck, George Washington University
In From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era,
Thomas C. Field builds on the scholarship of Michael Latham, Bradley Simpson, Amanda McVety and
others  to  produce  a  largely  convincing  portrait  of  how  United  States  development  programs
facilitated authoritarianism in developing world countries.[13] From Development to Dictatorship is an
impressively researched work. Field draws upon archival material from not only the United States
and Bolivia but also the United Kingdom, France, and the Czech Republic. Additionally, the author
conducted over  fifty  interviews with relevant  American and Bolivian protagonists  in  the events
covered in the book. There is little doubt that this is the best researched account of Kennedy-
administration relations with Bolivia and adds the important element of Bolivian agency to the story,
thus making a tremendous contribution to historiography. Although impressed with the quality of
research Field  has  conducted,  I  am left  unconvinced by his  argument  as  it  relates  to  broader
questions  about  the  foreign  policy  foundations  of  the  Kennedy  administration.  In  a  recent
historiographical essay on Kennedy administration policy toward Latin America, Jeffrey Taffet opined
that “historians of John F. Kennedy’s Latin American policies face a broad conundrum. Kennedy and
his  advisors  pledged  themselves,  publicly  and  privately,  to  transforming  hemispheric
relationships…Yet, in practice…Kennedy and his advisors undermined elections and freely elected
leaders, and in other cases they worked to strengthen authoritarian regimes.”[14] The vast majority of
scholarship on Kennedy’s policies toward Latin America has been critical. Most historians contend
that Kennedy came into office with idealistic intentions but the potential of the Alliance for Progress
was subverted by Kennedy’s intense obsession with fighting communism within the hemisphere. Field
takes an even more critical view of Kennedy administration policies in Bolivia arguing that, “Far from
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abandoning  ideology  in  favor  of  authoritarianism,  the  Kennedy  administration’s  approach  was
authoritarian from the beginning” (10).
 
Based on the lone case study of U.S. relations with Bolivia from 1961-1964, Field puts forward two
far-reaching  and  ambitious  propositions.  First,  he  contends  that  the  Kennedy  administration’s
approach toward development  favored authoritarian  dictators  as  its  preferred foreign partners.
Second, Field argues that military aid was the primary means by which Kennedy sought to stimulate
anti-communist modernization and development in the developing world. Taken together, Field paints
the picture of Washington pursuing an authoritarian-based development paradigm which he refers to
as “modernization’s heavy hand” (10). In order to assess the validity of Field’s thesis it is illuminating
to examine these claims from a broader perspective so as to measure the extent to which Kennedy
sought  to  form and maintain  relations  with  autocratic  rulers  as  well  as  the  role  that  military
assistance played in his overall foreign policy.
 
I will begin by putting Kennedy’s military assistance to Bolivia into context. Field writes that the
Kennedy administration “showered the Bolivian government with police,  military,  and economic
assistance” (38), providing “generous military assistance” (140) in order to transform the country into
“a model of authoritarian modernization” (130). Throughout the book Field repeatedly makes bold
statements such as: “given the aggressive nature by which US liberals intervened [in Bolivia] and the
sheer quantity of military hardware the Kennedy administration was sending, it was only a matter of
time before Bolivian blood would be shed in the name of the Alliance for Progress” (67). Any reader of
From Development to Dictatorship will certainly come away with the impression that the Kennedy
administration was heavy handed in sending massive amounts of military aid to Bolivia and that this
aid was not only unnecessary but that in the absence of such American largesse the Bolivian military
would not have had the strength to overthrow the country’s civilian leadership in 1964.
 
I was struck by the fact that in making such bold arguments Field never tells his readers exactly how
much military assistance the Kennedy administration sent to Bolivia. According to data from both the
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) Greenbook and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) the United States sent Bolivia a total of $9.1 million in military assistance
during the years 1961-63.[15] Does an average of $3 million per year in military assistance qualify as
‘showering’ a country with “generous military assistance”? This can be answered by putting such
data into perspective. According to SIPRI, Bolivia ranked only 87th (out of 110 countries) in the world
in military imports during that time frame with Ecuador being the only South American country to
import fewer arms.[16] With the exceptions of Guyana and Paraguay, the Kennedy administration sent
more military assistance to all other South American countries than it did to Bolivia.[17]
 
The  level  of  military  assistance  the  Kennedy  administration  provided  Bolivia  can  be  further
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contextualized  by  noting  that  military  assistance  accounted  for  only  6.5% of  the  total  aid  the
administration sent to Bolivia as compared to 7.8% of the aid sent by the Johnson administration and
16.5% of the aid provided by the Nixon and Ford administrations. With the exception of Guyana
(which did not receive any U.S. military aid at this time), Bolivia’s ratio of military to economic
assistance  from  the  United  States  was  the  lowest  on  the  continent  during  the  Kennedy
administration—with the proportion of military to economic assistance being two to six times higher
in other South American countries.[18] This data is in line with James Siekmeier’s argument that under
Kennedy the United States deemphasized the role of military assistance in its overall aid package to
Bolivia.[19] Despite Field’s assertions that Kennedy was overly reliant on military aid, on a global scale,
only 33.7% of all foreign assistance given by the Kennedy administration was military related, as
opposed to the much higher levels provided by the Eisenhower (45.4%) and Nixon/Ford (48.2%)
administrations.[20]  Field is  correct  to  point  out  that  the Kennedy administration gave a  massive
amount of assistance to Bolivia—much more than any other U.S. government. In fact, in constant
dollars nearly a quarter of all U.S. aid given to Bolivia during the entire Cold War was provided from
1961-1964. But it is hard to sustain an argument that Kennedy administration aid to Bolivia was
military-centric when 93.5% of U.S. aid to the country at the time was economic.[21]
 
Moreover,  From Development  to  Dictatorship  completely  disregards  the  fact  that  the  Bolivian
government had a legitimate need to increase the size of its military in the early 1960s. Only a
generation earlier, Bolivia’s military weakness had caused it to lose territory to every one of its five
neighbors:  Chile,  Peru,  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  even  Paraguay.  Additionally,  Field  reveals  that
independent  (and  oftentimes  anti-government)  militias  in  the  mining  areas  outnumbered  the
government’s  military  by  a  margin  of  16,000 to  7,500 men.  These  militias  owed allegiance  to
President Paz Estenssoro’s primary political rival, Vice President Juan Lechin, and through the labor
union which led them, defied the central government by refusing to accept its mandated worker
layoffs and took four U.S. citizens hostage in the standoff that ensued.
 
Therefore, when considering the context of both internal and external threats and the previously
cited SIPRI data showing that its neighbors were receiving more military imports than Bolivia during
this period, the $9.1 million in military assistance the Kennedy administration provided Bolivia hardly
seems disproportionate or massive but rather falls within the confines of the country’s legitimate
needs.
 
What of Field’s claim that Kennedy preferred relations with autocratic dictators? Robert Rakove and I
have both recently concluded quite the opposite. We argue that Kennedy’s emphasis was on forming
relations with the new generation of nationalist leaders such as India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt’s
Gamal Abdul Nasser, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Guinea’s Sekou Toure, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere,
and Indonesia’s Sukarno to name but a few.[22] Of course several of these leaders were autocratic
rulers themselves, but the point is that Kennedy’s focus was on courting nationalist leaders of the
non-aligned movement—of which Victor Paz Estenssoro could himself be characterized. Furthermore,
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rather than coddling Cold-War allies who ran autocratic dictatorships, the Kennedy administration
put  significant  pressure  on  governments  such  as  Iran  and  Saudi  Arabia  to  initiate  democratic
reforms.
 
More than any other United States president (including Jimmy Carter) Kennedy sought to distance
himself from autocratic rulers whom he viewed as relics of the past. This was vividly illustrated by his
refusal to visit King Saud when the Saudi monarch was receiving lengthy medical treatment at the
Peter Brent Brigham Hospital in Boston in the fall of 1961. Surely had Kennedy wanted to have warm
relations with the Saudi King he could have managed to visit him in Boston, which was after all the
President’s hometown. Instead Kennedy purposely avoided spending time at his Hyannis Port estate
and went to the family compound in Palm Beach in order to avoid being seen calling upon Saud. After
Saud’s release from the hospital the persistent Saudi monarch rented a house in Palm Beach—fifteen
minutes’ drive from Kennedy’s house—and still the American president was reluctant to visit the
Saudi king. It is hard to imagine any other American president treating the Saudi monarch in such a
disdainful way.[23]
 
In  contrast  to  Field’s  thesis,  a  strong argument  could  be made that  out  of  all  U.S.  Cold  War
presidents, John F. Kennedy was the least supportive of authoritarian rulers. Kennedy was the only
Cold-War era president who did not make a visit to a country with a non-democratic government
during his presidency (all others besides Harry Truman each visited at least five).[24]  Additionally,
Kennedy also held the lowest percentage of White House meetings with foreign heads of state who
were not democratically elected.[25] It was no coincidence that during his presidency Kennedy hosted
twenty-eight African heads of state at the White House (almost all of whom were democratically
elected) but only eight Latin American leaders (only two, Paz Estenssoro being one, were accorded
full state visit honors).[26] This was a presidential policy decision for Kennedy to personally identify
himself with the democratic and nationalist leaders of the world while distancing his presidency from
military  and  autocratic  leaders.  John  F.  Kennedy  courted  Paz  Estenssoro  because  he  was  a
democratically elected leader with nationalist credentials who took a semi-neutral position in the
Cold War—the type of foreign leader with whom Kennedy sought to form close relations —and not
because of the Bolivian president’s authoritarianism. Again, this is supported by Siekmeier, who
writes, “Paz Estenssoro was the type of noncommunist, democratic, nationalist, pro-U.S. leader that
the United States wanted to see throughout the Third World…Kennedy wanted to signal to the rest of
the world that the United States firmly supported noncommunist Third World nationalism, especially
of the democratic type.”[27]
 
I’m also skeptical  of  Field’s characterization of the 1964 Bolivian presidential  election as being
illegitimate.  While one can certainly criticize the fact that Paz Estenssoro amended the Bolivian
constitution to allow himself to run for re-election, it nonetheless seems as if Field exaggerates the
level of opposition to Paz Estenssoro’s candidacy. Field devotes several pages to a discussion of the
opposition’s campaign of ‘organized electoral abstention’ giving the impression that such opposition
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was widespread and that Paz was domestically unpopular (133-36, 143-46). He neglects, however, to
mention  pertinent  information—the  actual  election  results—which  would  change  a  reader’s
impression of this election. Paz Estenssoro received 97.9% of the votes cast in the 1964 Bolivian
presidential election. This could be disregarded if it were true that that a significant number of
Bolivians boycotted the election, but in fact 91.9% of all registered voters went to the polls. Far from
mass electoral abstention, there were over 300,000 more votes cast in 1964 than in any of the
previous presidential elections in Bolivia. In fact, according to Dieter Nohlen, 1964 was the highest
electoral  turnout  (in  terms  of  percentage  of  registered  voters  who  participated)  in  Bolivian
presidential election history.[28] Therefore, even if every eligible voter who abstained from voting had
cast their ballot against Paz Estenssoro he still would have captured an overwhelming 79% of the
popular vote. While acknowledging the possibility (likelihood?) of a certain level of electoral fraud in
these results, one can argue that they nevertheless suggest that the Bolivian president was more
domestically popular than Field’s narrative would suggest.
 
Field writes that “it seems that the closer historians study President Kennedy’s foreign policy in
individual countries, the more heavy handed it appears.” (37) I would counter that had Field’s book
taken a wider perspective to this study and considered the context that I have cited in this review, it
may have reached a different conclusion. Moreover, there is little doubt that Latin America was the
region that scared Kennedy the most, it was viewed as being too unstable, too vulnerable to Cuban
intrigue (in large part because of U.S. heavy handedness in the region), and too close to U.S. borders.
Rakove has persuasively demonstrated that Kennedy’s foreign policy toward Africa and Asia was
markedly less heavy handed.[29] In fact, the same evidence which Field has assembled in this book
could be used to tell a different narrative of U.S.-Bolivian relations during the Kennedy era along the
lines of Rakove’s Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World. An alternative telling of this history
could posit that it was his policy of courting nationalist leaders of the non-aligned world and his
implementation of the Alliance for Progress that prompted Kennedy to increase annual aid to Bolivia
by an astounding 229% of Eisenhower era levels.[30]  This was done despite the fact that Bolivia’s
leader, Paz Estenssoro, maintained relations with both communist Cuba and the domestic Communist
Party of Bolivia (PCB). Perhaps the real story of this history is how the Kennedy administration not
only tolerated, but supported and greatly increased, U.S. assistance to a left-leaning and neutralist
government. This is something that only occurred during the Kennedy/Johnson administrations and is
what makes the foreign policies of those presidencies unique.
 
Kennedy’s efforts to improve relations with such men as Paz Estenssoro, Nasser, Nkrumah, Toure,
and Sukarno and co-opt them into the New Frontier could be a dangerous proposition, and Field aptly
demonstrates that the policy blew up in Washington’s face in the case of Bolivia. Taken from this
perspective, U.S.-Bolivian relations during the Kennedy administration could be viewed as the dark
side of engagement with developing-world nationalist leaders. But what alternative did Washington
have other than supporting Paz Estenssoro? Recusal from Bolivia in the early 1960s would have
pushed it further into the Cuban/Soviet/Czechoslovak orbit and caused considerable criticism both
domestically and from Washington’s allies in South America, while backing the military against Paz
Estenssoro would have been Guatemala redux.
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It may be fair for Field and other historians to criticize Kennedy’s support of authoritative dictatorial
rulers and over-reliance on military assistance as foreign aid. Both were emblematic of United States
foreign policy for the entirety of the Cold War. But in criticizing him for such policies historians
should acknowledge that by any objective measure Kennedy’s reliance upon military assistance and
interactions with, and support for, non-democratic leaders holds up favorably compared to any other
U.S. Cold War president.
 
Review by Amy C. Offner, University of Pennsylvania
Larry Sternfield was the CIA station chief in Bolivia in 1964.  In his estimation, Claudio San Román,
the head of the Bolivian secret police, was “the most brutal Latin American I ever met,” and the
country’s torture sites “were the bloodiest things I’ve ever seen.”  Sternfield toured the torture
chambers after the government fell  to a military coup in November 1964.  “I’ve worked in six
countries,” he explained half a century later, “and the last days of the [Bolivian] regime were the
most repressive I ever saw” (168, 189).
 
From Development to Dictatorship by Thomas C. Field presents a harrowing vision of Bolivia under
the Alliance for Progress, arguing that development programs fueled authoritarianism and created
the conditions for military dictatorship.  Field’s meticulous case study substantiates the claims of
James C. Scott and James Ferguson, who argue that midcentury development programs strengthened
state power.[31]  And the book underscores what many U.S. diplomatic historians have suggested over
the last decade: development and counterinsurgency were hardly competing commitments during the
1960s, but rather twin instruments of modernization.[32]  The book’s central claim is thus its least
surprising  aspect.   What  distinguishes  Field’s  work  is  the  extensive  archival  research  that  he
conducted on three continents and his fascinating interviews with over fifty participants.  Together,
they create a compelling local portrait of the violence that anticommunist development brought on
the Bolivian left,  the fracturing of  the country’s nationalist  and revolutionary parties under the
pressures of U.S. intervention, and the forms of political mobilization that the Bolivian state fought
and cultivated in Andean mines and villages.
 
At its heart, the book is an explanation of the 1964 coup that toppled Víctor Paz Estenssoro and
established the military dictatorship of General René Barrientos.  The Alliance for Progress, Field
argues, incubated the coup in two ways.  First, it strengthened the Bolivian military by making it an
agent of development, sending soldiers into the countryside to conduct civic action programs and
casting generals, including Barrientos himself, as exemplars of apolitical professionalism.  At the
same time, the Alliance’s harsh labor reforms provoked armed resistance from communist tin miners
and their families.  The Paz regime’s massacre of mine workers in 1963 and intensifying political
repression eventually alienated broad sectors of Bolivian society. Ironically and chaotically, the rise of
the  military  through  development,  and  armed  resistance  against  the  developmentalist  state,
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converged in 1964, as the army, communist-led miners, right-wing guerrillas, and urban teachers and
students all turned on Paz.
 
The Bolivian president himself is the story’s central figure, and one of the book’s principal strengths
is its insistent demonstration that authoritarian development was a home-grown product of the 1952
Bolivian revolution.  The leaders of Bolivia’s state mining company, COMIBOL, shamelessly argued
that the country was unfit for democracy, and Paz survived as long as he did by rigging elections,
jailing opponents, and mobilizing indigenous militias in the countryside.  During the 1960s, U.S.
backing  shaped  the  revolution  by  exacerbating  rifts  between  Paz  and  the  left,  facilitating  the
expansion  of  the  military,  and  providing  the  bloodless  language  of  economic  development  to
legitimate political repression.  But Paz comes into focus as a shrewd, authoritarian nationalist who
retained decisive control over Bolivian politics.  Large portions of the book chronicle the regime’s
negotiations  with  U.S.  officials,  strategic  toleration of  Cuban revolutionaries,  and cultivation of
indigenous leaders,  military officers,  and a variety of  nationalist  and Marxist  parties at  home. 
Juggling these  relationships  was  the  essence of  nationalist  politics  in  the  Cold  War,  and their
mounting contradictions were ultimately Paz’s undoing.
 
As Field traces the life and death of the Paz regime and the internecine factionalism of Bolivia’s
political parties, he makes clear what Odd Arne Westad and others have argued: communism and
anticommunism were not the essential fault lines of politics in much of the global South.[33]  The U.S.
government struggled mightily to make them so during the Cold War, and the transformation of the
terms of  domestic  politics  was one of  the hardest-won battles  of  that  conflict.   Within Bolivia,
communism and Marxism took a variety of forms across party and social lines; the Communist Party
and the Cuban government each had a modus vivendi with the regime.  In conflicts with mine
workers, Paz bent U.S. anticommunism to his own purposes, using Alliance for Progress funds to
assault  trade  unionists  whose  crime  was  not  so  much  their  communism  as  their  political
independence and unwavering resistance to the elimination of  their  jobs.   At  other times,  U.S.
anticommunism became a liability for Paz, as when the Johnson administration forced him to cut ties
with Havana.
 
Field’s  book  is  political  history  in  two  senses.   It  is,  first  and  foremost,  an  interpretation  of
development  as  a  political  tool  chosen  by  Paz  to  strengthen  his  regime,  and  by  the  Kennedy
administration to combat Cuba.  Methodologically, it is a study of the high politics of inter-American
diplomacy and the Bolivian state’s  relations with organized political  parties,  militias,  and trade
unions.  These interpretive choices have their strengths, and Field displays a generous understanding
of political  history in highlighting the mobilization of  indigenous militias,  state violence against
mineworkers, and the ferocious radicalism of miners’ wives.
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Curiously enough, these very strengths suggest that an even richer book might have been written,
bringing the methods of social and cultural history to bear on Field’s remarkable source base.  To
take just one example, roughly half the book chronicles a devastating confrontation between Paz and
the independent, communist-led union at the Siglo XX tin mine.  Bolivia’s labor reform under the
Alliance for Progress aimed to eviscerate the union by laying off 5,000 workers, expelling communists
from positions of leadership, and curtailing the country’s labor laws.  It took nearly three years for
Paz to implement the plan, as workers and their wives struck the mines, staged hunger strikes, took
U.S. hostages, and faced down local militias with homemade grenades.  In a sense, this book is half-
articulated testimony to the shattering implications of losing a job and an independent union in
Bolivia’s tin mines.  What exactly did union members expect from their jobs and the state, and why,
for that matter, were indigenous militias so willing to fight them on those issues?
 
The story of  the miners begs,  likewise,  for  analysis  of  the gender ideology at  work within the
communist left.  Field reproduces fascinating interview material with miners’ wives, who describe the
most stunning acts of militance in the most conventionally patriarchal terms.  Calling themselves the
Amas de Casa (housewives), the women took charge of guarding four hostages that the union seized
in 1963, and prepared themselves to die, laying dynamite so that they could destroy the entire union
hall in case of a military ambush.  As it turned out, their husbands violated the women’s wishes by
agreeing to release the hostages, and ultimately revealed that they hadn’t had any bullets to load
their guns.  Gerónima de Romero conveyed her rage and disillusionment by explaining that she
nearly suffered a miscarriage after the hostages’ release.  Here and elsewhere, Field relays haunting
remarks in the same spirit that they were offered: as evidence of a woman’s sacrifice and anguish, or
a CIA station chief’s horror at working with torturers.  All of these quotations raise interpretive
questions about the consciousness of the speakers.
 
Ultimately,  Field’s  sources  might  help  us  think  about  the  layered  and vernacular  meanings  of
development and communism during the Alliance for Progress.  For communist trade unionists and
their wives, what would a legitimate social and economic order have been?  How would the nation’s
leading industry operate, and how would the family operate?  For all the incontrovertible value of
seeing development as high political strategy, and communism and anti-communism as geopolitical
commitments, they were never only those things.  Communists at Siglo XX fought the Paz regime
because they had a distinctive vision of social and economic order.  Development was a legitimating
discourse for Paz because it evoked meaningful material and social aspirations.  From Development
to Dictatorship  confirms what Scott,  Ferguson,  and Westad have written about development as
statecraft.  The history of the people who implemented and resisted the Alliance for Progress invites
us to read a wealth of new evidence with a mind to the social history questions of Laura Gotkowitz or
the anthropological questions of June Nash.[34]
 
Review by James F. Siekmeier, West Virginia University
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This is an excellent, well-researched book that contributes to the historiographies of the fields of U.S.
foreign relations, (economic) development studies, and Latin American history.
 
Although there are very good surveys of U.S.-Bolivian relations, and the Alliance for Progress (the
Alliance), of late there have not been too many case studies of the Alliance in action, where the
author  drills  down  on  a  particularly  important  aspect  of  the  Alliance.  Field’s  book  fills  that
historiographic gap.[35]
 
This book is particular interesting and important because it examines a time period (1961-1964) in
which the Bolivian Revolution, one of the five key revolutions in modern Latin American history (the
others  were  Mexico,  Guatemala,  Cuba,  and Nicaragua)  was  arguably  coming to  a  crisis-ridden
climax.[36] For its part, the United States witnessedthe wide application of U.S.-style ‘modernization
theory’ (or economic ‘developmentalism’) in the nonindustrialized world. That is, U.S.-style economic
development was being rigorously implemented in the Third World—in a top-down, authoritarian
fashion.  U.S.-style modernization was seen as the only antidote to a feared spreading of Moscow- and
Beijing-backed communism in the Global South. Indeed, the communist giants in the late 1950s
became more interested in attempting to spread communism in the nonindustrialized world.
 
Moreover, in the early 1960s, the United States was near the peak of its power, in historic terms. As
such, it behooves historians to examine U.S. foreign policy during a time period in which it arguably
had very significant ability to impose its will on other nations – in particular, the developing world.
Part and parcel of overweening power included new foreign policy tools. The Kennedy Administration
was actively using a military/foreign policy technique-–counterinsurgency--to support often-unsavory
but firmly anti-communist Third-World dictatorial friends (as in  Vietnam andIndonesia) as well as
attempting to topple anti–U.S. (and communist) governments (for example, in Cuba).
 
Few studies of United States-Latin American relations during the Alliance for Progress (or, more
simply, “Alliance”) years (1961-1969) closely analyze two important aspects of the Alliance. First,
U.S.  military  assistance,  overt  or  covert,  was  a  key  aspect  of  the  Alliance.  Second,  U.S.
developmentalist efforts were top-down affairs, and thus aided already-existing authoritarianism in
the region. This study deftly, and articulately, explains this intersection/connection. Bolivia is a very
important ‘case study’ of top-down, authoritarian, militaristic development, generously aided by U.S.
assistance, both economic and military. Field nicely encapsulates this important idea:  “It  [U.S.
economic development policy towards Bolivia] was Alliance for Progress development in action, an
aggressive modernization project implemented through armed force” (96).  Thus, Field’s work is an
important contribution to the history of United States-Latin American relations in one of its more
crucial decades. Even as the U.S. development was ‘top-down,’ however, Field subtly yet effectively
discusses how Bolivians, both elite and non-elite, exerted some agency over how this development
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process unfolded. The United States did not simply dictate terms to the Bolivians, but instead had to
react to Bolivian actions in the area of economic development policy.
 
It seems clear from Field’s analysis that if the United States did not exist, President Victor Paz
Estenssoro would have exerted power in an increasingly authoritarian fashion as he lingered on in
power.  But,  equally important,  is  that the firm, unwavering U.S.  backing of  Paz’s  authoritarian
developmentalism (and U.S. backing of Paz was well-known in Bolivia) exacerbated Paz’s already-
existing authoritarianism.  Understanding this intersection of U.S.-style top-down developmentalism
and Paz’s authoritarian developmentalism is key for understanding not only 1960s Bolivian, but Latin
American, politics and international relations in general.
 
The criticisms I have concern two areas:  first, time and space; second, political economy. Regarding
time/space, it would have been nice if Field had given the reader more context for U.S. economic
assistance in Bolivia – which stretched back to the early 1940s, and in the 1950s was already the
highest per-capita recipient of US economic aid in the world. Such generous assistance is head-
scratching, as the Bolivian Revolution, in the early years (1952-1956), was a deep, radical social
revolution. However, as the U.S. aid flow increased over the course of the 1950s, and U.S. leverage
with it, the Bolivian Revolution moderated.
 
As such, years before the Alliance was but a gleam in the eye of Kennedy’s experts on U.S. economic
assistance to the Third World, was Bolivia a kind of ‘laboratory’ for U.S. economic assistance and/or
development policy for Latin America? If so, what did U.S. officials learn from their 1950s Bolivia
experience,  and  were  these  conclusions  applied  in  constructing  the  Alliance?  Engaging  such
questions would also have given Field the opportunity to situate Bolivia, and U.S.-Bolivian relations,
in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations more generally.
 
Also, since Field’s devastating (and accurate, I would conclude) analysis of U.S./Paz Estenssoro top-
down, militaristic-authoritarian development policy is so well-documented, it would be interesting to
find out what he thinks about U.S.-Bolivian relations from 1964 to the present. It seems that Paz
Estenssoro set the stage for René Barrientos’s, Hugo Banzer’s, and Luis García Meza’s at-times
brutal military rule from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. However, it’s not clear that one can make
this historic ‘jump.’ In sum, it would have been nice to hear what Field thinks is the legacy of the Paz
Estenssoro 1961-1964 government for Bolivia and for U.S.-Bolivian relations—-especially considering
that once again Bolivia, due to its strident anti-Americanism, is one of the more important nations for
the United States in the region today.
 
Regarding political economy, it would have been nice to know what sort of differences/similarities
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there were between U.S. developmentalists and Paz Estenssoro with regard to what sort of economy
Bolivia should work towards in the long run. What visions did the different players have for Bolivia’s
economy in the future? I get a sense from the book that Paz would have wanted a more state-directed
economy, to promote diversification (Bolivia had coveted a tin smelter for decades so it could produce
tin metal, for example). For their part, I think U.S. officials would want minimal state power in the
area of political economy, letting the ‘free’ market allocate resources where they would be most
economically productive.
 
However,  these  are  minor  considerations.  This  book  is  extremely  well-researched  (the  use  of
interviews and international archives in particular), well-argued, and well-written. Students of Latin
American history, development studies, and U.S. foreign relations will benefit from reading this book.
 
 
Author’s Response by Thomas C. Field Jr., Embry-Riddle University
In the summer of 1961, two MIT economists attempted to chart the future of independent Nigeria. 
Arnold Rivkin was dispatched to the country by President John Kennedy, who was mulling over
massive development packages for dozens of states in the nonaligned Third World.  Rivkin was tasked
with evaluating Nigeria’s ten-year plan for “market discipline,” which had been drafted by his former
MIT colleague Wolfgang Stolper.  Having just been appointed top economic advisor to Prime Minister
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Stolper fancied himself the “best economist in West Africa,” and he aimed
to “weld the territory into a nation,” a noncommunist “oasis of rationality in a sea of unreason.”  The
Rivkin  Mission  reported  back  that  “much  is  stake  in  Nigeria,”  a  country  that  “offers  a  good
opportunity…to achieve development in a democratic [noncommunist] framework,” thanks to leaders
whose commitment to modernization reflected a “all-pervading spirit  of  determination.”  USAID
agreed with the economists that Nigeria offered “an excellent opportunity…to demonstrate to the
newly  independent  African  nations  that  the  best  way  to  achieve  their  economic  and  political
aspirations lies  in…cooperating with the Free [noncommunist]  World.”   Five years  and tens of
millions of dollars later, Prime Minister Balewa lay dead, his pretenses to nonalignment having been
hallowed out by the many conditions of U.S. aid funding.  For the next three decades, the reins of
Nigerian development were manned by a series of military officers.[37]
 
The 1960s may have been a good decade for development,[38] but they were a disaster for political
democracy, particularly for states whose civilian leaders had attempted to tread the fraught path of
Cold War nonalignment.  The Nigerian script had already played out in Brazil, Bolivia, Algeria, and
Indonesia, and it would be reenacted five weeks later in Ghana.  On a superficial level, this collective
narrative reads like the evolution of a Greek tragedy: “from development to dictatorship,” as my
book’s title suggests.  But the ideological seeds of these dictatorships and coups d’état were present
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  1960s.   Through  discourses  and  practices  of  authoritarian
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development, nationalist modernizers and their liberal U.S. allies sought to “pull more and more
people,”  in  Rivkin’s  words,  toward economic  and social  modernity. [39]   To  be  sure,  Third  World
nationalists and U.S. developmentalists did not always share the same vision of progress, but neither
believed that the path began with political democracy.  In the words of Kennedy’s ambassador to
Bolivia,  Ben Stephansky,  “political  development  could proceed” only  after  “sufficient  order  and
discipline…[was] evoked in order to achieve economic development…[thus] reducing the communist
threat” (57).  Even Kennedy’s authorization of CIA support for Iraq’s anti-British, anti-Communist
Ba’athists  in  1963  should  be  considered  alongside  the  administration’s  global  courtship  of
authoritarian modernizers, preferably civilians, whose brutal repression of right and left betrayed
their democratic trappings.[40]
 
In their generous reviews of From Development to Dictatorship, both James Siekmeier and Thomas
Tunstall Allcock identify new avenues for research on this topic.  Siekmeier pioneered the study of
U.S.-Bolivian bilateral history, and he is therefore right to point out that it would be useful to know
more about the wider chronology of the relationship, particularly the way Truman and Eisenhower
administration officials conceived aid, and how U.S. foreign policy struggled through the varied
dictatorships of the late 1960s and 1970s.  I also agree with him that more attention could be given to
the political economy of U.S.-Bolivian relations, a topic that Kevin Young is currently (and ably)
exploring.[41]
 
Allcock’s review was most gratifying, given our shared commitment to writing complex histories of
the U.S. and Latin America that transcend the exhausted and polarizing debates over agency.  Allcock
is correct to point out that I could have done a better job developing the characters on Bolivia’s right
and within its  Falange Party,  particularly  prior  to  its  launch of  guerilla  warfare in  mid-1964.  
Likewise, I could have provided a more explicit treatment of the effects of Brazil’s April coup on the
Bolivian military.   In both cases, I  followed the evidence: Bolivia’s right wing had been largely
dormant since a failed 1959 uprising (200n3), and Brazil’s role in the 1964 coup was limited to doing
nothing as these rightwing guerrillas used their remote Amazonian frontier as a rearguard (154-
160).  Finally, I was intrigued by Allcock’s assertion that Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin
lacked a commitment to development.  On Bolivia policy, at least, he sided with heavy-handed liberal
modernizers like Ambassador Stephansky, against realist skeptics like Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 
It is quite possible that these fluid categories belie a deeper dilemma within U.S. liberalism regarding
the obvious tensions between political democracy and technocratic development.
 
While Allcock appreciated that I let my sources “be fully aired” and that I “avoid heavy-handed moral
judgments,” Amy Offer would have liked to see a finer analytic edge applied to the Bolivian workers
and families who form the core of my narrative regarding the grassroots resistance to development. 
In her generally positive review, Offner recommends the theoretical tools of social  and cultural
history, which she believes would have gone further than political history in unpacking the complex
motivations that drove indigenous peasants to turn their rifles on trade unionists and prompted
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miners’ wives to hold U.S. development officials hostage.  At the outset, I should concede that social
criticism, so present in my treatment of Bolivia’s modernizing nationalists and their liberal U.S. allies,
did not travel with me to the countryside.  As an international historian, I was more interested in
understanding the local effects of ‘development’ and militarization than I was in unraveling the social
and  cultural  complexities  of  the  Bolivian  mining  camps.   By  provincializing  the  supposedly
cosmopolitan modernization theorists in La Paz and Washington, and by simply documenting miner
and peasant appeals to universal high politics, I sought to turn international history on its head
through a local narration of U.S. development programs on the ground.  Offner may be correct to
point out that quotidian concerns also motivated ordinary Bolivians to take up arms against (or for)
U.S.-style development, but I consciously chose to take the advice of miner’s wife and Communist
Party militant Domitila Barrios de Chungara: “If you’ll allow me to speak…”[42]
 
One of the reasons Offner likely calls for greater analysis of the Bolivians who resisted development
is her opinion that the book’s “central claim” regarding modernization and authoritarianism is also
“its least surprising.”  The development studies literature she cites, however, largely focuses on
agricultural development in Africa and Eurasia, and few of the international historians she references
implicate the Kennedy administration in what they generally depict to have been a late Kennedy or
early Johnson evolution toward dictatorship as hopes for democratic development dissipated in the
mid-1960s.  By identifying repressive tendencies in the first days of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress,
by emphasizing the voices of Bolivia’s own authoritarian modernizers and their enemies, and by
narrating  development  and  dictatorship  from  the  ground-up,  I  sought  to  provide  what  Offner
concedes to have been a “compelling local portrait of the violence that anticommunist development
brought on the Bolivian left” and, I would interject, the right.
 
If Latin Americanists like Offner have long accepted an implicit link between modernization and
authoritarianism, Philip Muehlenbeck’s review illustrates the extent to which development mythology
still  holds sway in diplomatic history.  Suggesting that my book is merely a “lone case study,”
Muehlenbeck simultaneously argues two seemingly contradictory points: that Kennedy’s increased
military aid to Bolivia was justified and that it did not, in fact, occur.  On the first point, I disagree
that it was “legitimate” to rebuild the Bolivian military in order to deal with workers who “def[ied]
the central government.”  (Nor do I share Muehlenbeck’s rosy perspective on Paz Estenssoro’s 1964
reelection with 97.9% of the vote, which even the pro-Paz White House conceded to have been a farce
[152].)  On the second point, I fail to see how a 1200% increase in military aid to Bolivia during the
Kennedy  administration  (see  Figure  1)  represents  anything  other  than  a  “shower.”   A  deluge,
perhaps?[43]
 
 
            Figure  1.  Data  from  USAID,  US  Overseas  Loans  and  Grants  (Greenbook) ,
https:/ /eads.usaid.gov/gbk/ [Available in the PDF edition]
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Muehlenbeck’s defense is  that  a number of  other Latin American countries also received large
upticks in military assistance during these years.  Does that not simply suggest a wider militarization
of the Alliance for Progress?  More importantly, these statistical acrobatics (downplaying Kennedy’s
military aid by considering it only as a ratio to rising economic aid, see Figure 2) fail to address one
of the book’s key findings: that “economic” aid had as much to do with creeping authoritarianism as
its more strictly conceived “military” counterpart.  Not only did USAID’s “economic” category mask
paramilitary training and weapons shipments that arrived under its Office of Public Safety (37, 48,
93-94, 134, 153-55, 178-79),[44] but Alliance for Progress “economic” aid also covered the cost of
military civic  action programs,  including the creation of  two engineering battalions from which
several coup leaders emerged (33, 57, 79-87, 141-42, 172, 206n126).  Even the purest “development”
program launched in Bolivia, the mine rehabilitation plan, was conditioned on the firing of thousands
and the physical removal of leftist union leaders, both of which were enforced in part by a USAID-
armed paramilitary.  Muehlenbeck’s larger point seems to be that the Kennedy administration’s ratio
of military to economic aid “compares favorably” to other “U.S. Cold War presidents”: a bit less than
Richard Nixon and Dwight Eisenhower; tied with Ronald Reagan.  This sets a remarkably low bar for
comparison. It  also fails  to distinguish between the types of  Third World authoritarianism each
president preferred, and it does not take into account the disparate methods each administration
employed to provide its chosen allies with military and economic support.
 
Figure 2. Data from USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/
[Available in the PDF edition]
 
None of this is to suggest, however, that the United States was secretly behind Bolivia’s 1964 coup. 
As Allock notes, From Development to Dictatorship departs from the standard narrative in which
military plots are conceived in Washington, incubated by local elites, and hatched in the barracks
under the stewardship of reactionary generals in collusion with the Pentagon or the CIA.  Instead, left
wing and right wing Bolivians took to the streets to bring down a U.S.-backed civilian regime, and the
military, as in the case of the Bolsheviks, “found power lying in the street, and picked it up.”[45] 
Recently,  Colin  Jones  called  for  greater  attention  to  “the  people”  in  collectively  authoring
revolutionary events, even those in which the left is soon “hoist by its own petard” in a distinctly
counterrevolutionary  denouement.   Jones’s  subject  is  the  overthrow  of  the  French  Jacobin,
Maximilien de Robespierre, on 9 Thermidor, but a similar dynamic was at play when President Paz
Estenssoro  abdicated on 4  November.   As  Bolivian mine union leader  Arturo  Crespo somberly
recalled, “We ground the wheat into flour, only to see others feast on the bread.”[46]
 
I want to thank Tom Maddux for commissioning these most thoughtful reviews and for selecting From
Development to Dictatorship for an H-Diplo roundtable.
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